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Abstract
We extend research on charity donations by exploring an everyday tactic for increasing
compliance: asking politely. We consider three possible effects of politeness on charity donations:
a positive effect, a negative effect, and a wiggle room effect where the perception of the request is
adjusted to decline donating without feeling selfish. Results from six experiments systematically
supported the polite wiggle room effect. In hypothetical donations contexts, indirect requests
were judged more polite. In real donation contexts, though, indirect requests were not judged as
more polite and had no consistent effect on donation decision. Rather, the decision to donate
predicted the perceived politeness of the request, independently of its phrasing. Experiment 4
provided causal evidence that participants justified their donation decisions by adjusting their
perception of the request. The polite wiggle-room effect has important implications for
organizations that seek to increase compliance while maintaining a positive image.
Keywords: prosocial behaviour; charity; donation decisions; politeness; ethical dissonance;
moral wiggle room
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The polite wiggle-room effect in charity donation decisions
Even though people are sensitive to the distress of those who are in need, they tend not to
give to charities until they are asked. This ‘power of the ask’ is well-known in fundraising circles,
and has received empirical and experimental support (Bekkers &Wiepking, 2010). Charities that
decrease their request volume after receiving a government grant raise less money (Andreoni &
Payne, 2003); donation requests increase the likelihood to give by up to 20 percentage points
(Andreoni, Rao, & Trachtman, 2016; Yörük, 2009; Meer & Rosen, 2011), and they can double
the amount given in experimental games conducted in the lab (Andreoni & Rao, 2011).
Given the importance of requests for charitable fundraising, the next logical step is to
understand which form a request should take in order to maximize its effectiveness. Accordingly,
a vast body of research has investigated the efficacy of various methods of solicitation. This
previous research typically manipulated the semantic information contained in the request, by
providing social information about the contribution of others (Frey & Meier, 2004), emphasizing
the situation of the beneficiaries (Hung &Wyer, 2014), focusing on a person before asking for a
group (Hsee, Zhang, Lu, & Xu, 2013).
Previous work has been extremely helpful in identifying the kind of information that
increase the effectiveness of charity requests. Charitable requests, though, do not only vary in
informational contents, but also in their degree of indirectness, a close proxy for politeness (Brown
& Levinson, 1978/1987). Indeed, speakers often veil their requests in indirect speech, rather than
stating them plainly (Lee & Pinker, 2010; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008; Clark & Schunk, 1980).
Even though the intent of a speaker would be made perfectly clear by using an imperative
such as ‘Make a donation,’ a polite speaker may prefer to use a question such as ‘Perhaps you
would like to make a donation?’, which does not convey the impression that the speaker can
make demands, or already assumes that the response will be positive. Indeed, politeness satisfies
two preferences of listeners: being positively valued, and being treated as autonomous (Brown &
Levinson, 1978/1987). Polite requests show consideration for the feelings of listeners, and treat
them as autonomous by showing that the decision is theirs to make. In daily life, we tend to
avoid directives in favor of more polite requests (Holtgraves & Yang, 1990), and for a good
reason: we believe that polite requests are more likely to be granted than requests phrased as
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directives (Bohns, 2016).
If charities followed this everyday usage, we would expect them to eschew directives in
favor of more polite requests. This is what was observed in a qualitative study of five British
charity commercials, which were found to use politeness strategies to soften their requests—for
example, phrasing the request as a question such as ‘We save the children; will you?’
(Pennock-Speck & Saz-Rubio, 2013). It is however easy to find examples that do not fit that
template. Table 1 displays the largest 10 charities in the US (as ranked by forbes.com) together
with the request that appears on the donation button displayed on the their home page, and the
header of the donation page to which the button links.
As shown in Table 1, there is no sign that charities generally avoid directives in favor of
more polite phrasings. In fact, most of the requests in Table 1 are phrased as directives. This can
easily be explained for donation buttons, whose design can only accommodate very short
sentences. However, the headers of donation pages do not have this constraint, and most of them
are still phrased as directives, e.g., ‘Support our work’ or ‘Make a donation to end childhood
cancer’. Not all requests are phrased as directives, though, which begs the question: Given all the
care that large charities give to their fundraising techniques, why did they not converge on a
common strategy to phrase their requests?
Table 1
Requests from the largest ten charities in the US (as listed by forbes.com, retrieved on 06/01/2016). The
table shows the phrase that appears on the donation button featured on the home page, as well as the header
of the following donation page.
Charity Donation button Header of donation page
UnitedWay Donate Support our work
Salvation Army Donate here Make a donation
Feeding America Donate Together we can solve hunger:
Donate to Feeding America
Task Force for Global Health Donate Your donation helps us help millions
St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital Donate now Make a donation to end childhood cancer
YMCA of the USA Give What would you like to give?
Goodwill Industries International Give a gift You make the difference
Food for the Poor Donate now Provide vital services to the poorest of the poor
Direct Relief Donate Deliver a world of good
American Cancer Society Donate to save lives Donate
One reason for this lack of convergence may simply be the lack of appropriate data. It
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might be that directives work best at eliciting donations, or that politeness works best—but that
in the absence of experimental work, this regularity has not been identified yet. In this article, we
fill that gap by considering three hypotheses linking the politeness of a request and the likelihood
of a donation.
Politeness helps. Our first hypothesis is simply that politeness helps. Under this
hypothesis, phrasing the request as a question (‘Would you like to donate’) or further hedging
that question (‘Perhaps you would like to donate?’) would be subjectively perceived as more
polite than a directive (‘Donate’) by potential donors, and would accordingly increase the
likelihood of a donation. This hypothesis is in line with standard results on politeness and
compliance: All other things being equal, directives are usually perceived as being low in
politeness (Dillard, Wilson, Tusing, & Kinney, 1997; Holtgraves, 1992), and elicit lower rates of
compliance (Jenkins & Dragojevic, 2013; Quick & Considine, 2008; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Dillard
et al., 1997; Enzle & Harvey, 1982; Wilson & Kunkel, 2000).
Politeness hurts. While the Politeness Helps hypothesis is plausible, it is also possible that
Politeness Hurts in the context of charity requests. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that politeness
is not required in urgent and desperate situations (Brown & Levinson, 1978/1987; Kellermann &
Park, 2001; C. A. Miller, Wu, & Ott, 2012). Using politeness in these situations can decrease
their communicated urgency, and decrease in turn the likelihood of getting help (Kronrod,
Grinstein, &Wathieu, 2012; Colaizzi, Williams, & Kayson, 1984). Just as ‘Would you be so kind
and help me?’ does not communicate the same urgency as the imperative ‘Help!’, we may expect
that a polite request such as ‘Perhaps you would like to donate?’ does not communicate the same
urgency as the directive ‘Donate.’ Accordingly, a polite phrasing of the donation request may
decrease the likelihood of a donation, by downplaying the urgency of helping the beneficiaries.
Furthermore, politeness may also decrease the likelihood of a donation because it makes it easier
to say no, rather than ‘giving in’ to social pressure (Flynn & Lake, 2008; Bohns, 2016). This may
be especially true for face-to-face encounters, though, which are not the focus of the current
article.
Politeness as moral wiggle room. Our final hypothesis is grounded in the idea that people
commonly seek to satisfy two simultaneous but sometimes conflicting goals: promoting their
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financial prospects, and maintaining a positive view of themselves (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011).
When financial prospects can only be promoted by unethical behavior, people experience a state
known as ethical dissonance, in which they may try to justify their unethical, self-interested
behavior by redefining it as excusable (Barkan, Ayal, & Ariely, 2015; Chance & Norton, 2015;
Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). Being asked to donate money to a charity is not quite a case
of ethical dissonance (it is not unethical to decline to donate), but it still creates a conflict
between the pursuit of material self-interest and the desire to maintain a moral image of the self
as a charitable and generous person. In such situations, people are known to engage in what has
been variously called ethical manoeuvering (Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011), fudging
(Ariely, 2012), or moral wiggle room (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007).
People who engage in moral wiggle room leverage whatever aspect of the situation that
can disguise or explain away their selfish behavior, in order to do what is the most beneficial
while avoiding to look selfish in their own eyes (Exley, 2016). In the specific context of charity
requests, we believe that people who do not wish to donate may leverage the phrasing of the
request in order to excuse their decision. The logic is the following: People who do not wish to
donate can explain away their decision by considering that the request was impolite, whatever
way it was phrased. Under this Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis, we expect that (i) the phrasing of
the request has no effect on its perceived politeness; (ii) it has no effect on the likelihood of a
donation; but (iii) individuals who decide not to donate will find the request to be less polite,
whatever the way it is phrased.
Note that while the Politeness helps and Politeness hurts hypotheses assume that politeness
has a causal impact on charitable donations, the Polite wiggle room hypothesis assumes that the
decision to donate has a causal impact on the perception of the request as polite or impolite.
Given that this is our preferred hypothesis, we do not expect to identify a causal driver of
charitable donations. Indeed, the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis departs from several common
assumptions about the effect of (charity) requests on compliance. The contents and phrasing of a
request are commonly assumed to have a causal effect on compliance that is mediated by their
impact on the requestee’s beliefs (C. H. Miller, Lane, Deatrick, Young, & Potts, 2007; Small &
Loewenstein, 2003). For example, showing a picture of a potential beneficiary may increase
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compliance because it increases the requestee’s certainty that help is indeed needed (Jenni &
Loewenstein, 1997). In contrast, the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis reverses the causal link
between beliefs and compliance, by considering that requestees may change their beliefs because
they do not want to donate and still want to maintain a positive view of themselves (Chance &
Norton, 2015).
Accordingly, the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis offers an explanation of the conflicting
findings about the effect of linguistic politeness on compliance (Kronrod et al., 2012; Colaizzi et
al., 1984; O’Keefe, 1997). If the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis is correct, then it is not surprising
that polite requests may work or backfire in different occasions, or have an erratic impact on
perceived politeness, since their causal link to perceived politeness and compliance is weakened
when requestees engage in moral wiggle room. The implications of this phenomenon will be
explored in the General Discussion section.
Method Statement
All experiments received ethical approval from Kingston Business School (England). We
report all measures and conditions for all experiments—for example, the fact that a study does
not report intrusiveness effects means that only politeness was measured in that study. Two
experiments in which the donations were hypothetical are reported in Appendix C rather than in
the main text, because we favour experiments in which the donations were real. Results in
studies A and B are consistent with those reported in the text (albeit not exactly similar in terms
of politeness and intrusiveness ratings, see Appendix C).
We used an a priori stopping rule to determine a sample size for each experiment
following a rule of thumb. In terms of sensitivity, with 80% power and 5% alpha, our sample sizes
across all experiments were sensitive enough to detect small effects for the main manipulation as
well as for the effect of donation on politeness—f 2s from 0.02 to 0.04 for an effect of a predictor
using a multiple regression analysis adjusted for gender and age. In addition, with 80% power
and 5% alpha, our sample sizes were sensitive enough to detect small-to-medium to medium
effects of the main manipulation on donation, that is, odd ratios ranging from 2.1 to 3.0 (Cohen,
1988; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
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No participants were excluded from analysis, provided that they responded to all questions
used in the analysis. The only exception is Experiment B (reported in Appendix C), from which
23 participants were excluded because a system check showed that sound was not working on
their computer, preventing them from hearing the request for a donation. Data from all
experiments is available on the Open Science Framework: goo.gl/ffGH55.
Pretest of donation requests
All experiments compared the efficacy and perception of three donation requests. The first
request was a directive (‘Donate to unicef now!’), which we assumed to be the least polite
phrasing. The two other requests were two slightly different but expectedly more polite
questions (‘Would you like to donate to unicef now?’ and ‘Could you perhaps donate to unicef
now?’). We will refer to them as the would-question and the could-question.
Our experiments assumed the directive to be less polite and more intrusive than the
would- and could-questions. We verified that this was indeed the case by asking 302 participants
to judge the politeness and intrusiveness of these requests as third parties, that is, as disinterested
observers who were not asking nor being asked for money.
Participants (N = 302, 44% women, median age 32, age range 18–69) were recruited on
Amazon Mechanical Turk and read a vignette in which a person asked another for a charity
donation. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions in which the request was a
directive, a would-question, or a could-question:
Person A asks person B for a charitable donation as follows: [Directive] Donate to
unicef now! [Question] Would you like to donate to unicef now? [Hedge] Could you
perhaps donate to unicef now?
Participants rated whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of statement about the
politeness and intrusiveness of the request (see Appendix A). The politeness scale featured 14
items and was developed to assess whether the two basic needs of requestees were fulfilled: the
need to be respected and the need to be autonomous; some items were adapted formMacGeorge,
Feng, Butler, and Budarz (2004). The intrusiveness featured eight items which measured
persuasion awareness (Feiler, Tost, & Grant, 2012) and psychological reactance Jonason and
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Knowles (2006). Participants provided their judgments on a 7-point scale anchored at completely
disagree and completely agree. The politeness and intrusiveness scales showed good reliability, with
a Cronbach’s alpha of .83 for politeness and .93 for intrusiveness.
As expected, the politeness of the directive (M = 2.9, SD = 0.9) was perceived as
significantly lower than both the politeness of the would-question (M = 4.4, SD = 1.0), and the
politeness of the could-question (M = 4.2, SD = 0.9). The 95% confidence interval for the
difference in politeness between the directive and the would question was [−1.5, −1.1],
t(200) = −10.4, p < .001, d = −1.46. The difference in politeness between the directive and
the could-question was [−1.7, −1.2], t(197) = −10.6, p < .001, d = −1.50. The would- and
could-questions did not significantly differed in politeness, [−0.4, +0.1], t(193) = −1.0,
p = .33, d = −0.14.
Again as expected, the intrusiveness of the directive (M = 4.8, SD = 1.3) was perceived as
significantly greater than both the intrusiveness of the would-question (M = 3.5, SD = 1.4), and
the intrusiveness of the could-question (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4). The 95% confidence interval for the
difference in intrusiveness between the directive and the would question was [+1.3, +2.1],
t(199) = 8.6, p < .001, d = 1.21. The difference in intrusiveness between the directive and the
could-question was [+0.9, +1.7], t(198) = 6.9, p < .001, d = 0.97. The would- and
could-questions did not significantly differed in intrusiveness, [−0.8, +0.1], t(198) = −1.9,
p = .06, d = −0.27.
Experiments 1 and 2
In these two experiments, participants were compensated for their time, and were
presented with a request for a charity donation at the end of the experiment. They could make a
donation by parting with some of the money they earned in the experiment.
Methods
Participants in Experiment 1 (N = 196, 38% women, median age 27, age range 18–74) and
Experiment 2 (N = 162, 50% women, median age 32, age range 19–60) were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The donation request and subsequent questions appeared at the end of a
5-minute survey on climate change predictions. The donation request appeared together with a
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picture of a child (borrowed with permission from the UNICEF website), and came in one of
three phrasings: [Directive] Donate to unicef now! [Would-Question]Would you like to donate to
unicef now? [Could-Question] Could you perhaps donate to unicef now? Participants who indicated
they wanted to make a donation were directed to a donation page. Finally, all participants
(whether they made a donation or not) rated the request for politeness by completing the
politeness scale. The politeness scale of the pretest was adapted to a first-person perspective but
the questions were otherwise as close as possible to that used in the pretest (see Appendix B).1
The politeness scale achieved a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha in both experiments (.79 and .75).
The donation page was different in the two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants
simply indicated how much of their participation bonus ($1) they wished to give to unicef. In
Experiment 2, we followed the procedure of Soyer and Hogarth (2011) by asking participants to
indicate how much they were willing to donate to unicef if they won the $40 lottery in which
they entered by participating in the study.
Results
We follow a 2-step analysis strategy. First, we assess whether the phrasing of the request
impacts its perceived politeness and intrusiveness, as well as the likelihood of a donation (and the
amount of the donation when it’s not zero). Second, we assess whether the likelihood of a
donation can explain the perceived politeness and intrusiveness of the request, controlling for
the phrasing of the request. Under the Politeness Helps and Politeness Hurts hypotheses, we can
expect the phrasing of the request to impact politeness, intrusiveness, and the likelihood of a
donation. Under the Polite wiggle Room hypothesis, we can expect the likelihood of donation, but
not the phrasing of the request, to predict politeness and intrusiveness.
All regressions we report control for age and gender,2 and use simple contrasts for the
Request variable, comparing the would- and could-questions separately to the directive phrasing.
Regressions were conducted using the lm or glm function in base R (R Core Team, 2015).
Figure 1 offers a visual summary of the findings of the two experiments. As shown in
1Participants who made a donation also filled out a sub-questionnaire about their motivations, which we do not
analyze further in this manuscript.
2We controlled for age and gender as a matter of standard operating procedure, but the results of all studies stay
the same if we do not include these covariates in the regressions.
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Figure 1. Results of Experiments 1 to 3. Phrasing the request as a would- or could-question did
not increase its perceived politeness nor the likelihood of a donation (shown here as a
percentage). However, the perceived politeness of the request was always greater among
participants who decided to make a donation, independently of its actual phrasing.
Figure 1, phrasing the request as a would- or could-question did not increase its perceived
politeness nor the likelihood of a donation (displayed within each panel as the percentage of
participants who did not donate on the left side, and the percentage of participants who donated
on the right side). However, in line with the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis, the perceived
politeness of the request was always greater among participants who decided to make a donation.
These observations were confirmed by statistical analyses. Tables 2 and 3 display the
results of the first step of analysis for the Experiments 1 and 2. In both experiments, the phrasing
of the request had no impact on its perceived politeness nor on the decision to donate. Table 4
displays the results of the second step of analysis, for Experiments 1 and 2. In both experiments,
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Table 2
First step of analysis, Experiment 1 (regression coefficients and standard errors). Phrasing the request as a
would- or could-question had no impact on its perceived politeness nor on the probability of obtaining a
donation.
Dependent variable
Politeness Donation Amount (if 6= 0)
OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Would-Question −0.11 −0.42 −0.04
(0.17) (0.37) (0.11)
Could-Question −0.25 −0.01 0.005
(0.17) (0.36) (0.10)
Gender (Women) 0.12 0.50 0.04
(0.14) (0.31) (0.09)
Age 0.01∗ −0.01 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Constant 3.53∗∗∗ −0.17 0.35∗
(0.24) (0.51) (0.16)
Observations 196 196 75
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
the request was rated as significantly more polite by participants who decided to make a
donation, whereas its actual phrasing had no detectable effect.
In sum, data supported the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis more than the Politeness Helps or
Politeness Hurts hypotheses. The phrasing of the request did not influence its perceived politeness,
nor the decision to donate, but participants apparently adjusted their impression of politeness as
a function of whether they wanted or not to make a donation.
In Experiments 1 and 2 participants made their donation decision first, and assessed the
request after. It is possible that this sequence encouraged participants to base their politeness
ratings on their donation decisions, thus amplifying the impact of donation on perceived
politeness, and undercutting any effect of phrasing on perceived politeness. To rule out this
possibility, Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 1 and 2 while counterbalancing the order of the
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Table 3
First step of analysis, Experiment 2 (regression coefficients and standard errors). Phrasing the request as a
would- or could-question had no impact on its perceived politeness nor on the decision to donate.
Dependent variable
Politeness Donation Amount (if 6= 0)
OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Would-Question −0.04 −0.40 0.01
(0.09) (0.20) (0.02)
Could-Question 0.01 −0.14 0.01
(0.06) (0.13) (0.01)
Gender (Women) 0.13 0.11 0.06∗
(0.15) (0.34) (0.03)
Age 0.01∗ 0.02 0.0003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.001)
Constant 3.39∗∗∗ −1.23∗ 0.07
(0.22) (0.50) (0.04)
Observations 162 162 63
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
donation and politeness questions.
Experiment 3
Methods
Participants in Experiment 3 (N = 354, 42% women, median age 34, age range 18–72) were
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The donation request and subsequent questions
appeared at the end of a short survey on the interpretation of verbal uncertainty. Participants
were randomly assigned to see one of the three phrasings of the request. Within each group, half
of the participants saw the request, made their donation decision, and then rated the politeness
and intrusiveness of the request. The other half saw the donation request, rated its politeness and
intrusiveness, and then made their donation decision. Participants indicated how much of their
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Table 4
Second step of analysis, Experiments 1 and 2 (regression coefficient and standard error). The decision to
make a donation has a strong impact on the perceived politeness of the request, in contrast to the phrasing
of the request.
Dependent variable
Politeness
(Experiment 1) (Experiment 2)
Would-Question −0.05 0.14
(0.16) (0.15)
Could-Question −0.25 0.20
(0.16) (0.17)
Donation (Yes) 0.68∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13)
Gender (Women) 0.04 0.10
(0.14) (0.12)
Age 0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.005)
Constant 3.23∗∗∗ 3.05∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.22)
Observations 196 162
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
participation bonus ($1) they wished to give to unicef.
Results
The aggregated findings of the study are displayed in the right panel of Figure 1.
Donations were considerably lower than in Experiments 1 and 2—we speculate that this is the
result of not using in Experiment 3 the child picture that accompanied the donation request in
Experiments 1 and 2. Table 5 displays the results of the first step of analysis in which we regress
our dependent measures on the phrasing of the request, the order in which the questions were
asked, and their interaction. As in the two previous experiments, the phrasing of the request had
no impact on the politeness and intrusiveness of the request, nor on the donation decision or
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donation amount. The phrasing of the request did not interact with the order manipulation.
Table 5
First step of analysis, Experiment 3 (regression coefficients and standard errors). Phrasing the request as a
would- or could- question had no detectable impact on its perceived politeness and intrusiveness, and this
result held whether the politeness/intrusiveness questions were asked before or after the donation decision.
The same results hold for the likelihood of making a donation and for the donation amount, if different
from zero.
Dependent variables
Politeness Intrusiveness Donation Amount
OLS OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Would-Question −0.09 −0.24 −0.41 0.05
(0.17) (0.29) (0.44) (0.14)
Could-Question 0.20 −0.20 −0.55 0.06
(0.17) (0.29) (0.45) (0.14)
Order (Politeness First) −0.17 0.54∗ −0.23 −0.15
(0.17) (0.30) (0.45) (0.14)
Gender (Women) −0.29∗∗ 0.12 −0.06 0.15
(0.10) (0.18) (0.27) (0.09)
Age 0.0003 0.01 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)
Would-Question × Order (Politeness First) 0.34 −0.28 0.45 −0.05
(0.24) (0.42) (0.65) (0.20)
Could-Question × Order (Politeness First) −0.003 −0.24 0.48 −0.01
(0.24) (0.42) (0.66) (0.20)
Constant 4.04∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ −1.20∗ 0.41∗
(0.20) (0.35) (0.53) (0.16)
Observations 354 354 352 71
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 6 displays the results of the second step of analysis. The decision to make a donation
had a large impact on both perceived politeness and intrusiveness, compared to the small and
heterogeneous effects of the phrasing of the request. Results showed some hints of an interaction
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Table 6
Second step of analysis, Experiment 3 (regression coefficients and standard errors). The decision to make a
donation, but not the actual phrasing of the request, had a strong impact on the perceived politeness and
intrusiveness of the request.
Dependent variables
Politeness Intrusiveness
(1) (2)
Would-Question 0.09 −0.43∗
(0.12) (0.20)
Could-Question 0.24∗ −0.39
(0.12) (0.20)
Donation (Yes) 0.90∗∗∗ −1.41∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.29)
Order (Politeness First) 0.03 0.23
(0.11) (0.19)
Gender (Women) −0.27∗∗ 0.09
(0.10) (0.17)
Age 0.001 0.01
(0.004) (0.01)
Donation × Order (Politeness First) −0.48∗ 0.76
(0.24) (0.42)
Constant 3.72∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.33)
Observations 352 352
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
between the donation decision and the order manipulation, suggesting that the donation decision
had a lower impact when it came last. This effect, however, is driven by participants who made a
donation (MPoliteness = 4.7 vs. 4.2 when the donation decision came first vs. last,
MIntrusiveness = 2.2 vs. 3.1 when the donation decision came first vs. last). Participants who did
not make a donation were not affected by the order manipulation (MPoliteness = 3.7 vs. 3.8 when
the donation decision came first vs. last, MIntrusiveness = 3.5 vs. 3.7 when the donation decision
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came first vs. last).
In sum, Experiment 3 confirmed the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. While there is some
suggestion that asking the politeness questions first decreased the effect of the donation decision
on politeness ratings, this interaction effect was small and mostly driven by participants who
made a donation—and thus not in need for wiggle room.
Although our results so far support the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis, they could also be
explained in terms of personality differences between individuals who donate and individuals
who do not. It is possible that individuals who have a propensity to make charity donations also
have a charitable disposition in the way they assess politeness. Such a disposition would explain
why individuals who donate also find requests more polite (however they are phrased), without
the need for postulating a wiggle-room mechanism.
To address this concern, we conducted a final experiment in which we re-contacted the
participants of Experiment 3 in order for them to rate again the politeness of the request, while
giving them a false reminder of their donation decision. If participants who made a donation rated the
request as more polite because of a predisposition to do so, their politeness ratings should stay
the same even when told that they did not donate. In contrast, if participants use politeness
judgments as moral wiggle room, they should rate politeness as a function of the reminder they
receive, and not as a function of the actual decision they made.
We are mindful of the fact that deception techniques should only be used sparingly and
responsibly, when they deliver a scientific value that is not feasibly achieved by non-deceptive
techniques. In the course of this project, we were unable to identify a non-deceptive technique
that would allow us to move beyond correlational results and provide causal evidence for the
polite wiggle room effect. Nonetheless, we acknowledge the use of deception as one limitation of
the current article.
Experiment 4
In this final experiment, the participants of Experiment 3 were contacted three months
later to do a follow-up rating of the politeness and intrusiveness of the request they were
presented with, only with a twist. Before the rating task, we gave participants a reminder of the
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decision they made three months earlier. This reminder was actually randomly assigned: half the
participants were ‘reminded’ that they donated, and the other half were ‘reminded’ that they did
not donate. The prediction of the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis is that participants would rate
the politeness and intrusiveness of the request as a function of this feedback, and not as a
function of their actual decision in Experiment 3.
Methods
Participants in Experiment 4 (N = 187, 44% women, median age 36, age range 18–68) were
invited to take part in a follow-up to Experiment 3 three months after the initial data collection
(not all participants of Experiment 3 accepted this invitation, hence the smaller sample size in
Experiment 4). About 49% of the participants who took part to Experiment 4 had decided to
make a donation in Experiment 3. Participants were approached as follows:
We are interested in your perception of a donation request that you received in April 2015
in an Amazon Mechanical Turk online questionnaire. It is not a problem if you do not
remember answering this questionnaire.
Participants were then told:
Few months ago (in April 2015) you took part in a research in which you received a bonus
and you were given the possibility to donate some of your bonus to unicef. In April, you
chose [to donate / not to donate] some of your bonus to unicef. We are now only interested in
your perception of the donation appeal. So we will show you the appeal as you have seen it
in April and we will ask you a few questions about how it makes you feel now.
Participants randomly received a reminder that they donated, or a reminder that they did
not donate. They were then shown the request phrased in the same way as it was for them three
months earlier, and rated its politeness and intrusiveness. Finally, participants were asked if they
thought our records were correct to show that they [did / did not] donate to unicef in the April
survey.
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Table 7
Regression analyses, Experiment 4 (regression coefficient and standard error). Participants who were
reminded that they donated found the request more polite and less intrusive than participants who were
reminded that they did not donate.
Dependent variables
Politeness Politeness Intrusiveness Intrusiveness
Would-Question 0.25 0.21 −0.55∗ −0.55∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26)
Could-Question 0.48∗∗ 0.43∗∗ −0.23 −0.16
(0.14) (0.14) (0.28) (0.27)
Donation 0.24 −0.26
(Yes) (0.14) (0.27)
Reminder 0.41∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗
(You donated) (0.11) (0.22)
Gender (Women) 0.03 −0.01 −0.13 −0.08
(0.12) (0.11) (0.22) (0.22)
Age −0.004 −0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.005) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.82∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.43) (0.43)
Observations 185 187 185 187
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Results
Almost all (95%) participants who received a correct reminder accepted it as correct,
whereas participants who received an incorrect reminder were split about whether it was correct
(42% correct, 58% incorrect). Table 7 displays the regression analyses of politeness and
intrusiveness, using either the actual decision in Experiment 3 or the reminder in Experiment 4
as predictors. As expected from the Polite Wiggle Room hypothesis, Politeness and Intrusiveness
ratings were significantly predicted by the reminder given in Experiment 4, but not by the actual
decision made in Experiment 3. In a way that was largely independent from the phrasing of the
request itself, participants who were told that they donated thought the request was more polite
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Table 8
Regression analyses, Experiment 4 (regression coefficient and standard error), on the subsample of
participants who accepted the reminder as correct. Participants who were reminded that they donated
found the request more polite and less intrusive than participants who were reminded that they did not
donate.
Dependent variables
Politeness Politeness Intrusiveness Intrusiveness
Would-Question 0.07 0.04 −0.39 −0.42
(0.17) (0.16) (0.33) (0.31)
Could-Question 0.48∗∗ 0.46∗∗ −0.40 −0.40
(0.18) (0.17) (0.34) (0.33)
Donation 0.39∗ −0.43
(Yes) (0.17) (0.32)
Reminder 0.67∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗
(You donated) (0.14) (0.27)
Gender (Women) 0.06 −0.03 −0.29 −0.20
(0.15) (0.14) (0.27) (0.26)
Age −0.01 −0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.91∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.26) (0.52) (0.50)
Observations 124 125 124 125
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
and less intrusive than participants who were told that they did not donate.
It might be surprising that participants relied so much on our feedback, while expressing
doubts that it was correct. We believe that many participants who indicated that there might be a
problem with our records were not in fact absolutely sure of what they did 3 months before,
which would explain why they relied on our feedback even though they had doubts about it. This
is speculative, though, because we do not have a measure of their confidence.
For robustness purposes, we conducted similar analyses conducted on the subsample of
participants who accepted the reminder as correct. These analyses delivered essentially the same
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results, as shown in Table 8. The effect of the actual decision on Politeness ratings crosses the .05
significance threshold, but this effect remains small, about half as large as that of the reminder,
which (expectedly) increased in the subsample.
General Discussion
People are more likely to give to charities when they receive a request to do so, and
considerable work has been devoted to identifying the elements of a successful request. However,
this body of research had not yet explored the common everyday tactic of asking politely. In this
article, we considered three hypotheses about the effect of politeness in the context of online
charity requests: that politeness would help, that politeness would hurt, and that politeness
would be used as moral wiggle room for rationalizing the donation decision. For the most part,
our results supported the third hypothesis. Increasing the linguistic politeness of a request (by
turning it into a would- or could-question) did little for its perceived politeness, and did not
increase the likelihood of a donation—but the perceived politeness of the request was always
lower for people who did not make a donation, independently of its phrasing. In sum, it appears
that people adjusted their judgment of how polite the request was, to match their decision to give
or not.
Note that our findings cannot speak to the exact temporal sequence of decision (giving or
not giving) and evaluation (judging how polite the request was). The fact that we observed a
wiggle-room effect in Experiment 3, in which we collected politeness judgments before
collecting donations, does not imply that the wiggle-room takes place before the decision.
Indeed, we must expose participants to the request first, before collecting either judgments or
donations. As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility that participants made a decision as
soon as they read the request, before they were asked for politeness judgments. Nonetheless, it
would seem more plausible that the decision comes first, and the wiggle-room second—either as
an attempt to adjust self-perceptions in a favorable direction, or as a device for actually going
through with the difficult decision to not donate, once one has mentally committed to it
(Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Levy, 2015). Results of Experiment 4 show that a reminder
was enough to trigger polite wiggle-room, without the need for an actual decision. This suggests
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that, at least in this experiment, the wiggle-room aimed at adjusting self-perceptions—but this
does not rule out the possibility that wiggle-room was also used as a commitment device in the
other experiments. Since our experiments were not designed to tease out these possibilities, we
have to leave this interpretation as a speculation.
While our experiments were always consistent with the polite wiggle-room hypothesis,
we occasionally found a small positive effect of the phrasing of the request on politeness and
intrusiveness ratings. This suggests that our participants’ linguistic judgments were not fully
compromised by their attempts to rationalize their decisions. This effect was detected in 4 of the
12 statistical tests conducted in the four experiments which used real financial donations
(Tables 4, 6, 7). Interestingly, it was almost always detected (7 tests out of 8) in the two
experiments reported in Appendix C, which used hypothetical donations only. We suspect that
this hypothetical character weakened the need for wiggle room, because it makes it easier both to
dismiss the request (since no harm is actually done) and to overestimate one’s likelihood of giving
(since there is no actual cost attached to this decision).
People can find many excuses for not complying with prosocial requests (Chance &
Norton, 2015; Exley, 2016; Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006). The current article shows that one of
these excuses is to find fault with the request by a biased assessment of its politeness. These
results are in line with recent development in the field of behavioral ethics and prosocial
behavior. While people may willingly engage in prosocial behavior, they often ‘give in’, that is,
they reluctantly perform altruistic actions because they do not want to appear selfish, to others or
to themselves (Cain, Dana, & Newman, 2014). People who ‘give in’ would rather not give, if they
could do so without feeling selfish, and incur the negative emotional consequences attached to
that feeling (Burgoyne, Young, &Walker, 2005). Various tactics can be employed in that service.
People can try to avoid requests altogether, even at a cost (Lin, Schaumberg, & Reich, 2016); they
can seek situations where selfishness is externally imposed, to avoid personal responsibility
(Berman & Small, 2012); or they can rationalize the decision not to give, by emphasizing the risk
that their donation may not actually be helpful (Exley, 2016). In this article, we have identified
another tactic that can be used to justify the decision not to comply with a prosocial request:
People who do not want to give can find fault with the way the request is phrased, considering it
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as impolite, however it is actually phrased.3
While this interpretation is consistent with current trends in behavioral ethics, our results
are open to another (complementary) interpretation. People who decide to donate could
exaggerate the politeness of the request in order to maximize the personal benefits of their
altruistic action. Prosocial behavior triggers a wealth of positive emotions and psychological
benefits (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2014; Raposa, Laws, & Ansell, 2015), which are stronger when
one does not feel coerced into helping (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). Given that request are
experienced as less coercive when they are more polite, donors may amplify their positive
emotions and psychological benefits by recasting the request as polite and non-coercive—just as
non-donors may attenuate their negative emotions by recasting the request as impolite and
coercive. Another possible interpretation, in line with self-perception theory (Bem, 1967, 1972),
is that people impassively observe their donation decision and try to infer why they made it: if
they did not donate, they infer that there was something annoying or otherwise negative about
the request. This interpretation does not draw on ethical dissonance, but its practical
implications are similar.
Indeed, whether people adjust their perceptions of politeness to enhance the psychological
benefits of giving, to attenuate the psychological costs of not giving, or simply to explain their
own decision, our findings suggest that such mechanisms can lead to virtuous or vicious circles
with respect to charity donations. People differ in their propensity to give to charities (Aknin,
Dunn, & Norton, 2012; Bekkers &Wiepking, 2010; Kogut & Ritov, 2011), and our results
suggest that perceptions of politeness can compound these individual differences. Every time an
individual decides to give or not give, this individual adjusts her perception of how politely the
donation request was phrased, and this evaluation can affect her perception of the charity that
issued the request. A similar effect is observed with online advertising: ads which are perceived
as intrusive negatively affect one’s perception of the website that contains them (McCoy,
Everard, Galletta, & Moody, 2016). Similarly, we may expect that requests which are subjectively
perceived as impolite or intrusive negatively affect one’s perception of the charity that issued
3We are not claiming that perceived politeness is the only mechanism people can use to justify non-donations.
For example, and as discussed in the introduction, people may also rationalize that a would- or could-question signals
that a request is less urgent. Self-serving justifications are complex and opportunistic, and no single mechanism may
capture them all.
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them. As a result, the decision to not donate may decrease the probability of a future donation
because one’s perception of the charity is adversely affected by the polite wiggle roommechanism.
Accordingly, our results suggest that charities should be mindful of polite wiggle room for
two reasons: first, to increase the likelihood of a donation; and second, to engage in damage
control with respect to individuals who decline to donate. Changing the phrasing of the request
to make it linguistically more polite will have limited impact. A more promising strategy would
be to restrict the wiggle room that people have when making subjective judgments of
(im)politeness. For example, it might be a good strategy to make direct requests such as ‘Donate,’
while emphasizing the urgent and desperate situation of the beneficiaries—because such an
emphasis will make it more difficult to find the request impolite. Other strategies may attempt to
provide an ‘out’ that would decrease the need to use polite wiggle room for people who want to
decline the request: suggesting to simply ‘like’ a donation request to show support (without
donating), offering an easy exit strategy that would not require to say ‘no’ (Dana et al., 2006), or
quickly mentioning a ready made excuse to explain away a decision not to donate, that would not
speak to the request or the requester (e.g.,‘no worries! One simply cannot donate on every
occasion!’). Future research may explore the relative benefits of the two approaches, and the
possible biases they may introduce.
Future research may extend our results to face to face communication, which offers
different opportunities and constraints than online solicitations. In particular, saying no is more
unpleasant in face to face communication (Roghanizad & Bohns, 2017), and may lead to a
stronger need for justification, and thus a stronger re-assessment of the request and the
requester. Finally, we note that the mechanisms we investigated, and their implications, may also
apply beyond the domain of charity donations. Public campaigns promoting healthy or green
behavior, as well as for profit advertising campaigns, can all benefit from considering how people
reconstruct messages as controlling or intrusive when they do not wish to comply. Restricting
the availability of polite wiggle room may be instrumental in these broader domains, both to
increase compliance and to preserve the positive image of the organization that issued the
message, in the eyes of the individuals who did not wish to comply.
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Appendix A
Items used in the pretest
All items are scored on a 7-point scale anchored at strongly disagree and strongly agree. (R) denotes
reverse-coded items.K: Taken fromMacGeorge et al. (2004); S: Taken from Goldsmith (2000); :
Persuasion awareness items, adapted from Feiler et al. (2012);i: Psychological reactance items taken from
Jonason and Knowles (2006); g: new items.
Politeness Scale
Person B feels liked. K
Person B feels good about himself. K
The request makes it clear that he could choose whether or not to take it. S
The request leaves person B free to do what he wants.S
Person B feels accepted. g
Person B feels guilty. (R)g
Person B feels negatively about himself. (R)g
Person B feels uncomfortable. (R)g
Person B feels pressured to donate. (R)g
The request is quite direct. (R)g
The request leaves person B the room to say no. g
The request is not assertive. g
The request is blunt. g
The request leaves person B free to say no. g
Intrusiveness Scale
Person B feels someone is intruding on his beliefs. 
Person B feels the donation request is coercive. 
Person B feels the donation request is controlling. 
Person B feels that the donation request is based on an ulterior motive.
Person B can tell that someone is attempting to influence him. 
Person B wants to resist the attempt to influence him. i
Person B wants to do the opposite.i
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Person B feels compelled to resist.i
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Appendix B
Items used in the main studies
All items are scored on a 7-point scale anchored at strongly disagree and strongly agree. (R) denotes
reverse-coded items.K: Taken fromMacGeorge et al. (2004); S: Taken from Goldsmith (2000); :
Persuasion awareness items, adapted from Feiler et al. (2012);i: Psychological reactance items taken from
Jonason and Knowles (2006); g: new items. The intrusiveness score was an average of the scores in
persuasion awareness and psychological reactance.
Politeness Scale
The request made me feel liked. K
The request made me feel good about myself. K
The request left me free to do what I wanted. S
The request made it clear that I could choose whether or not to take it. S
The request made me feel accepted. g
The request made me feel guilty. (R) g
The request elicited a negative feeling about myself. (R) g
The request made me feel uncomfortable. (R) g
The request was directive. (R) g
The donation request made me feel pressure to donate. (13) R g
The request left me the room to say no. g
The request was blunt. (R) g
The request was not assertive. g
I felt free to say no. g
Intrusiveness Scale
I felt that someone was intruding on my beliefs. 
I felt the donation request was coercive. 
I felt the donation request was controlling. 
I could tell that someone was attempting to influence me. 
I felt that the donation request was based on an ulterior motive. 
I wanted to resist the attempt to influence me. i
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I wanted to do the opposite. i
I felt compelled to resist. i
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Appendix C
Experiments A and B
In these experiments, participants indicated the hypothetical likelihood that they would make a donation
in an everyday context, after being exposed to one of three phrasings of a donation request. They also
rated the request for politeness and intrusiveness. The only difference between the two experiments was
that the request was presented in written form in Experiment A, while it was voiced by computer software
in Experiment B.
Methods
Participants in Experiment A (N = 335, 36% women, median age 34, age range 18–76) and
Experiment B (N = 251, 42% women, median age 31, age range 19–68) were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The donation request and subsequent questions appeared at the end of a 5-minute
survey on risk communication in a medical context. The donation vignette described an everyday context,
and ended with one of three possible phrasings of the request:
Imagine that you are going to do some grocery shopping. You have some bank notes and
a few small coins in your pocket. In front of the shop door a man stands with a small bucket
labelled with a unicef logo and the picture of a needy child. When you pass near the man, he
says to you: [Directive] Donate to unicef now! [Would-Question]Would you like to donate to
unicef now? [Could-Question] Could you perhaps donate to unicef now?
Participants first indicated the likelihood that they would make a donation, on a 7-point scale
anchored at very unlikely and very likely. Second, they indicated the amount they would give, after being
asked to imagine they had 5 dollars and 40 cents with them in the context of the request. Third, the
perceived politeness and intrusiveness of the request were measured by the 14 and 8 items (respectively)
shown in Appendix B. The measures of politeness and intrusiveness achieved satisfactory Cronbach’s
alphas in the two experiments (.82 and .77 for the politeness scale; .91 and .91 for the intrusiveness scale).
Results
We follow a 2-step analysis strategy. First, we assess whether the phrasing of the request impacts its
perceived politeness and intrusiveness, as well as the likelihood of a donation (and the amount of the
donation when it’s not zero). Second, we assess whether the likelihood of a donation can explain the
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perceived politeness and intrusiveness of the request, controlling for the phrasing of the request. Under
the Politeness Helps and Politeness Hurts hypotheses, we can expect the phrasing of the request to impact
politeness, intrusiveness, and the likelihood of a donation. Under the Polite wiggle Room hypothesis, we can
expect the likelihood of donation, but not the phrasing of the request, to predict politeness and
intrusiveness.
All regressions we report control for age and gender, and use simple contrasts for the Request
variable, comparing the would- and could-questions separately to the directive phrasing. Regressions
were conducted using the lm or glm function in base R (R Core Team, 2015). To contextualize these
statistical analyses, it is helpful to turn to Figure C1, which displays the findings of both experiments. The
average likelihood of a donation (shown as a grey vertical line) was essentially the same in all conditions,
which suggests that the phrasing of the request had little effect on the likelihood of a donation. Politeness
and intrusiveness ratings (respectively shown above and below the regression lines) appear to be higher
and lower, respectively, when the request was phrased as a question; and they seem to be largely correlated
to the likelihood of a donation.
Tables C1 and C2 display the results of the first step of analysis for the two experiments. In
Experiment A, phrasing the request as a would- or could-question question clearly increased its politeness
and reduced its intrusiveness, while having little detectable effect on the likelihood of a donation. Similar
results were obtained in Experiment B.
Table C3 displays the second step of our analysis, in which we assessed whether the likelihood to
donate and the phrasing of the request predicted politeness and intrusiveness perceptions. In both
experiments, ratings of politeness and intrusiveness appeared to reflect a mixture of the phrasing of the
request and the likelihood of an hypothetical donation. The likelihood of a donation always had a strong
impact on the ratings, but phrasing the request as a would- or could-question had an even greater impact.
In sum, data from Experiments A and B did not support the Politeness Hurts hypothesis but provided
partial evidence for both the Politeness Helps and the Polite Wiggle Room hypotheses. In line with the
Politeness Helps hypothesis, phrasing the request as a would- or could-question impacted its perceived
politeness (positively) and its perceived intrusiveness (negatively). On the other hand, there was very little
evidence that more polite requests increased the likelihood of donation. This result is in line with the Polite
Wiggle Room hypothesis, but this hypothesis also predicted that politeness and intrusiveness ratings would
only be influenced by the likelihood of a donation, and not by the phrasing of the request.
Accordingly, Experiments A and B did not discriminate well between the Politeness Helps and the
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Figure C1. Results of Experiments A and B. The average intention to give is shown by the vertical
lines, and is essentially the same for all phrasings of the request. However, perceived politeness
and perceived intrusiveness are predicted by the decision to give.
Polite Wiggle Room hypotheses, which may be the consequence of the hypothetical character of the request
and the donation. This hypothetical character makes it easier both to dismiss the request (since no harm is
actually done) and to overestimate one’s likelihood of giving (because there is no actual cost attached to
this response). To obtain stronger results, we tested our hypotheses with real donation requests in
experiments 1-4 reported here.
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Table C1
First step of analysis, Experiment A (regression coefficient and standard error). Phrasing the request as a
question clearly impacts its politeness and intrusiveness, but not the likelihood of a donation.
Dependent variables
Politeness Intrusiveness Likelihood Amount (if 6= 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Would-Question 0.89∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ 0.52∗ −0.01
(0.12) (0.20) (0.23) (0.04)
Could-Question 0.60∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗ 0.23 −0.04
(0.12) (0.19) (0.22) (0.04)
Gender (Women) −0.08 −0.31 0.65∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.10) (0.17) (0.20) (0.03)
Age −0.001 0.01 0.01 −0.002
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)
Constant 3.30∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.27) (0.31) (0.05)
Observations 335 335 335 184
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table C2
First step of analysis, Experiment B (regression coefficient and standard error). Phrasing the request as a
question impacts its politeness and intrusiveness, but not the likelihood of a donation.
Dependent variables
Politeness Intrusiveness Likelihood Amount (if 6= 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Would-Question 0.66∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗ 0.06 −0.005
(0.13) (0.23) (0.27) (0.04)
Could-Question 0.72∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗ −0.25 0.01
(0.13) (0.24) (0.27) (0.04)
Gender (Women) −0.02 −0.15 0.51∗ −0.01
(0.11) (0.19) (0.22) (0.03)
Age 0.01∗∗ −0.02 0.02∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)
Constant 2.99∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.19) (0.33) (0.38) (0.06)
Observations 251 251 251 134
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table C3
Second step of analysis, Experiments A and B (regression coefficient and standard error). The likelihood of
a donation always have a strong impact on perceived politeness and intrusiveness, but so does phrasing the
request as a would- or could-question.
Experiment A. Dependant variables Experiment B. Dependant variables
Politeness Intrusiveness Politeness Intrusiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Would-Question 0.79∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗
(0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.22)
Could-Question 0.55 −0.44∗ 0.76∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22)
Z (Donation likelihood) 0.36∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
Gender (Women) −0.21∗ −0.15 −0.10 0.01
(0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.18)
Age −0.004 0.02∗ 0.01∗ −0.01
(0.004) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
Constant 3.48∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.26) (0.18) (0.31)
Observations 335 335 251 251
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Appendix D
Standardized effects, all studies
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Table D2
Second step of analysis. Effect of the decision to donate on politeness and intrusiveness ratings. Table shows
beta coefficients. Pol = Politeness, Int = Intrusiveness.
Exp A Exp B Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3
Pol Int Pol Int Pol Pol Pol Int
Would-Question 0.38 −0.23 0.35 −0.21 −0.02 0.07 0.05 −0.12
Could-Question 0.28 −0.14 0.40 −0.25 −0.12 0.09 0.05 −0.12
Donation 0.38 −0.28 0.31 −0.38 0.33 0.57 0.39 −0.35
Women −0.11 −0.05 −0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 −0.14 0.03
Age −0.05 0.13 0.12 −0.06 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.09
Politeness first 0.02 0.07
Donation × Polite first −0.15 0.14
